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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAURICE W. SMITH and ANITA L. ) 
SMITH, his wife, 
) ". 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
) Case No. 14163 
v. 
MRS. BETH PEARMAIN, BARRY D. 
JOHNSON, and HEARTLAND REALTORS, ) 
a Utah corporation, 
. ' • . . ) ' 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Based on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
plaintiffs sued defendant for rescission of their contract 
for the purchase of certain real property and for damages. 
Defendant counterclaimed for damages resulting from plaintiffs1 
failure to perform their obligations under an assignment of 
contract and requested the court to foreclose plaintiffs' 
interest in said contract and the property described therein. 
Defendants Barry D. Johnson and Heartland Realtors, a Utah 
corporation, were dismissed on their own motions by the lower 
court. All references herein to defendant and appellant apply 
to the sole defendant remaining in the case, Beth Pearmain. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted rescission of the contract and 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the total sum of 
$13,058.76 and judgment of no cause of action with respect 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to defendant's counterclaim. * •..;. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the 
lower court reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant 
and further relief as appears equitable to the Court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The property which is the subject of the present dispute 
is located at 1131 Wilson Avenue in Salt Lake City. (R.22) 
In the year 1930 the owner of the property, a Mr. N. P. 
Nielson, petitioned the City Board of Adjustment for a variance 
from the terms of the zoning ordinance so as to permit the 
erection of a brick radio parts building at the rear of the 
lot, replacing an old frame barn and chicken coop then being 
used to produce radio parts, in a section of the city zoned 
as residential "A" which did not permit shops. (Exhibit 34-D; 
R.104-1G5) , 
In approving Mr. Nielson0s petition, the Board of Adjust-
ment found that an "unnecessary" hardship would be suffered 
by the petitioner if restrained from building as contemplated 
and that the "spirit of the ordinance" would be upheld and 
substantial justice done by granting the variance, providing 
the building was restricted to one story and basement occupying 
24 X 30 feet as indicated in the plan filed with the petition. 
The Board specifically ruled as follows: 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition be granted; 
that the order and decision of the Chief Building 
Inspector be reversed and that said officer is hereby 
2 
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directed to issue permit in accordance with the order 
and decision of this Board, building to be not more 
[than] 24 X 30 feet and restricted to 1 story and 
basement in height." (Exhibit 34-D)(Emphasis added) 
No other restrictions were placed on the use of the property 
in addition to those stated above. (Exhibit 34-D) 
At the time his petition was granted, Mr. Nielson was 
not living on the property. (Exhibit 34-D; R.95) There 
was, however, a residence on the front part of the lot 
which was apparently being rented out. (Exhibit 34-D) 
In 1942 a Mr. Roestenburg, who had purchased the 
property, petitioned the City for a variance from the 
zoning ordinance for the privilege of building an addition 
to an accessory building, including a double garage with 
office and filing cabinets in the upstairs, which would be 
16 1/2 feet or 1 1/2 feet higher than previously allowed 
by the Board. (Exhibit 35-D) At that time Mr. Roestenburg 
was using the already existent shop to produce tools of 
war. (Exhibit 35-D) The Boavd granted Mr. Roestenburg1s 
petition in accordance with the plan submitted, as an 
extension of the former variance granted under Case No. 230. 
(Exhibit 35-D) The Board noted in its decision that the 
petitioner would suffer unnecessary hardship from a denial 
of the variance and that the spirit of the zoning ordinance 
would be best upheld and substantial justice done by 
granting the variance as an extension of the former variance. 
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"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the variance be granted 
in accordance with the plan submitted and as an 
extension of former variance granted under Case No. 
230; that the order and decision of the Chief Building 
Inspector be and the same is hereby reversed and said 
officer is hereby directed to issue permit in 
accordance with the order and decision of this Board 
providing permit is applied for within six months 
after the signing of this order." (Exhibit 35-D) 
Again, no other restrictions or conditions were placed on 
the use of the property except those clearly stated above. 
(Exhibit 35-D) The Board's order states nothing with 
respect to occupancy of the residence, operation of the 
shop or number of employees permitted. (Exhibit 35-D) 
When Mrs. Pearmain, Defendant and Appellant herein, 
moved into the neighborhood at 1137 Wilson Avenue in 1950, 
Mr. Roestenburg was on a mission and his shop was being 
rented out to a heating or sheet metal company. (R.lll) 
The residence was being occupied by two separate parties 
as a duplex (R.109) pursuant to R-2 zoning which permitted 
two-family dwellings. (Exhibit 35-D; R.29) 
About three months after Mrs. Pearmain moved into 
number 1137 Wilson Avenue, Mr. Roestenburg returned from 
his mission and resumed using the rear facilities of his 
property as a machine shop (R.lll); however, he operated 
the shop as an absentee owner and continued to rent out the 
duplex for approximately 21 years. (R.233) The testimony 
below established that the residence had always been used 
as a duplex during the entire 25-year period Mrs. Pearmain 
had lived in the neighborhood and that it has been occupied 
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by many people during that period. (R.17) 
Mrs. Pearmain purchased the property at 1131 Wilson 
Avenue from Mr. and Mrs. Roestenburg in August, 1971, on 
a uniform real estate contract. (R.226; R.176) That 
contract provided that Mr. Roestenburg could continue to 
use the machine shop at the rear of the property so long 
as he was capable of doing so. (R.176) He continued to 
use the shop and garage pursuant to the contract provision 
until his death, at which time Mrs. Pearmain rented out the 
garage at $50.00 a month to her sons for the purpose of 
storing two dragster racing cars (R.20,28); and the machine 
shop was rented out to an ornamental light company (R.226) 
which assembled, painted and stored ornamental light 
fixtures. (R.62,63) 
In December, 1972, Mrs. Pearmain, being a widow and 
desiring to dispose of the property at 1131 Wilson (R.26), 
listed it for sale through Heartland Realty (Exhibit 11-D; 
12-P) with Mr. Barry Johnson as listing salesman. (Exhibit 
12-P) The property was advertised in the Deseret News 
under the rental income column as "Duplex with Shops near 
Westminster College." (Exhibit 11-D) 
Mr. Smith, Plaintiff and Respondent herein, a resident 
of California, saw the ad in the News and called Mr. Johnson 
to inquire. (R.22-23) According to Mr. Smith's testimony, 
he was informed by Mr, Johnson that the shops were being 
utilized under a 1945 non-conforming use permit which would 
5 
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be invalid if the property were vacant for a year and a day 
and that it was zoned R-2 which permitted a duplex. (R.25) 
He also testified that Mr. Johnson told him that the shops 
could be utilized for light manufacturing and that there 
were a variety of businesses that would be interested in 
utilizing such a facility. (R.25) 
On April 7, 1973, Mr. Smith personally inspected the 
property (R.27), including the basement, the machine shop 
and one of the apartments. (R.28) There were three or 
four individuals working in the machine shop, painting and 
storing ornamental light standards, on the day of inspection. 
(R.62-63) 
Subsequent to his inspection, Mr. Smith entered into 
a contract with Mrs. Pearmain for the purchase of the 
property and took possession on June 1, 1973. (Exhibits 
2-P, 4-P, 5-P, 6-P) 
In the early part of February, 1974, Mrs. Pearmain 
received a letter from Smiths8 attorney, advising her that 
Smith intended to rescind the contract for the reason that, 
since his purchase^ the City had ordered him to vacate the 
rear building and to cease from manufacturing activities 
on the property for the reason that such activities were 
illegal. (Exhibit 14-P) 
The record fails to disclose how the question of the 
property's use came before the City. There is some evidence 
that it may have been the result of a complaint from the 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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neighbors in protest to the building of a boat in the 
driveway by one of the tenants. (Exhiit 10-P) 
On the other hand, the matter may have come before the 
City in the form of an application of some sort initiated 
by Mr. Smith. Although no such application is a part of 
the record, some reference to an application is made in the 
City's findings. (Exhibit 10-P) 
There is no evidence in the record of any official 
written communication from the City until August 15, 1973. 
(Exhibit 35-D) That communication is in the form of a 
letter (Exhibit 20-P; 35-D) from the City Planning Director 
to Mr. Smith in apparent response to an earlier letter 
from Mr. Smith dated July 23, 1973, wherein Mr. Smith had 
inquired about the permissible uses of the property. 
(Exhibit 21-P) The City Planning Director advised as 
follows: 
"In answering your questions, it is our opinion that 
the tenant for the commercial building would have to 
live in the residential building in front and that the 
building in the rear would be limited to a one-man 
machine shop with no welding or repair work of any 
type. 
"I would assume that the Board of Adjustment would 
have jurisdiction in this matter and could elaborate 
on this use provided there were no additional employees 
involved. 
"If there is any other i»formation we can provide, 
please contact usT" flxhlbit 20-P)(Emphasis added) 
The next official written communication from the City 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which is a matter of record is a letter from the Board of 
Adjustment to Mr. Smith, dated December 17, 1973, advising 
him of the Board's decision that the use of the property 
is illegal and must be vacated, (Exhibit 10-P) Attached 
to the letter are the findings and order of the Board 
wherein the Board ordered as follows: 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Board sustain the 
administrative decision that this is an illegal use 
and that the property be vacated; that the Board 
feels the intent was for a family-operated business 
and the use now has changed and is, therefore, in 
violation and in any event the present usage of the 
property is a substantial enlargement from the original 
variance and no parking facilities have been provided 
and such a change of use is beyond the original 
varianceo" 
There is no evidence in the record of any written 
decision from the Planning Director or the Chief Building 
Inspector or any other City official prior to the decision 
of the Board of Adjustment which is marked Exhibit 10-P. 
No reference was made iii rhe letter marked Exhibit 
20-P to any decision on the part of the Director or the 
Board ordering that the property be vacated or that the use 
be changed. 
Without appealing from the decision of the Board, 
Smiths, Plaintiffs and Respondents herein, commenced this 
action in February of 1974 wherein they alleged that 
defendant and defendant's agent made certain false and 
misleading statements which induced them to enter into a 
contract for the purchase of said property. Plaintiffs 
8 
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g@\ifht f©£ rdieiision of said eontiraet and damag#§. fh@ 
low©* e©\H?t £\altd in fchtir favor and htne© this appeAl. 
ARGUMENT 
fOINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT IELQW TO 
FIND THAT DEFENDANT MADE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS, SUCH THAT 
WOULD ENTITLE PLAINTIFFS TO RESCIND THEIR CONTRACT. 
A. Essential Elements of Fraud Action. 
wmttmmmmM i w n w » m——uwnwm' i mi <n» i if"<«»>mm« ^tmmm»mM.ammum' ^uMmiwmmtmmMmamemmnmm 
This Court in the case of Pace v» Parrlih, 122 Utah 
141, 247 P,2d 273 (1952) , held that a plaintiff has the 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence all of 
the following essential elements in order to recover on 
the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations: 
"These ares (1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) 
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing 
the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was 
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage•" 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence all of the above listed elements and 
it was therefore error for the court to allow rescission• 
Specifically, one of the questions presented to the 
court on appeal is whether defendant made a representation 
concerning a presently existing material fact which was 
false* Defendant submits that this question must be 
9 
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\ 
answered in the negative for the following reasons: 
1. According to Mr. Smith's testimony, Mr. Johnson, 
the salesman, made the statement to him that the machine 
shop and garage were being utilized under a 1945 non-
conforming use permit. (Exhibit 11-D; R.25) 
2. Assuming such statement was in fact made by Mr. 
Johnson, plaintiffs have failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that it was false at the time it was 
made. 
3. Plaintiffs base their entire case on the faulty 
reasoning that, because the Board of Adjustment ultimately 
decided that the present use was illegal, the prior state-
ments of Mr. Johnson were false. 
4. The better reasoned authority is that a subsequent 
legal decision adverse to a statement or representation 
previously expressed as to the law cannot establish prior 
fraud. 37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §73, p.116 (2d 
ed. 1968) 37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §184 (2d ed. 
1968) further states the law as follows: 
"Except where it may be regarded as continuing in 
character, the truth or falsity of a representation 
is generally to be determined as of the time it was 
made, and subsequent changes do not affect the 
liability of the person who made it." 
5. Furthermore, representations or statements 
concerning domestic law are not ordinarily regarded as 
representations of fact, but rather expressions of opinion 
10 
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on which no action in fraud will lie, even though they are 
false, 37 AM. JUR. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, §73, p.113 (2d 
ed. 1968) Accord, Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 
P.2d 264 (1947); Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Company, 
86 Utah 52, 12 P.2d 623 (1932). See, also, 37 AM. JUR. 2d, 
Fraud and Deceit, §§45,73 (2d ed. 1968), for proposition 
that the above rule extends to representations as to what 
the law requires to be done, and representations as to what 
the law will not permit to be done, especially when the 
representations are made by the avowed agent of the adverse 
interest, or when there is no confidential relationship 
between the parties. See 37 AM. JUR. 2d, supra, §74: The 
principal of non-responsibility for misrepresentations of 
law has been applied to false representation by a vendor 
of land as to a matter of law relating to his rights in 
and to the land. 
B. Application of Law to Facts. 
Mr. Johnson's alleged statement that the shop was 
being operated under a 194 5 non-conforming use permit is 
an entirely reasonable and valid opinion and interpretation 
of the use that was originally granted in 1930.and later 
enlarged in 1942. 
The original variance was granted for the erection of 
a radio parts building. It was later expanded in 1942 to 
permit the construction of an addition to the shop. At 
that time the premises were being used to manufacture 
11 
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tools for war. 
It is interesting to note that both in 1930 and 1942 
the respective owners were petitioning the City for approval 
to construct a new building or addition to an already 
existing building. It is apparent from examining the file 
on each case (Exhibits 34-D and 35-D) that the owner was 
already using the premises to manufacture, in one case 
radio parts, and in the other case tools of war prior to 
the filing of their respective petitions. 
In both of these instances the Board had adopted a 
very liberal approach and interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance and variance, finding in each case that "the 
spirit of the ordinance will be upheld and substantial 
justice done" by granting, extending and expanding the 
variance. 
The testimony is to the effect that in the last 25 
years the same shop and premises has been used as a machine 
shop for some type of manufacturing. (R. 21,111) It is 
possible that Mr,, F" stenbux j ceased manufacturing tools 
of war some time subsequent to 1945; however, the testimony 
offered at trial established that he continued to use the 
shop as a machine shop. (R.21,111) In his absence the 
shop was utilized by a heating or sheet metal company. 
(R.lll) 
The Board of Adjustment in 1973 stated its opinion 
that the previous Board "assumed it would be a family-
12 
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operated business when they granted the variance." The 
Board takes great liberty by stating such an opinion. Not 
only was the first variance in 1930 granted to an absentee 
owner (one who did not occupy the residence on the front 
of the lot), but there is no evidence^ whatsoever, that any 
"family-operated" business was involved. (Exhibit 34-D) 
The court below acknowledged that there was no 
limitation in the 1930 decision with respect to ownership 
or occupancy of the house along with the new structure. 
(R.116) 
Neither is there any evidence in 1942 of a "family-
operated" business. In that case the Board took note of 
the fact that a variance had been granted in 1930; that 
the petitioner had now increased the business and was 
making tools of war industry; that a Mr. Beatty, father-in-
law, who was owner of adajcent property, had deeded 4 1/2 
feet to petitioner in order that he might build a double 
garage 20 X 20 feet with office and filing cabinet space 
upstairs and that this would be an extension of the old 
variance. Nov/ it is certainly far fetched for the Board 
to Conclude that a "family business" was being conducted, 
merely by virtue of the fact that the father-in-law had 
deeded some property to the petitioner. 
No mention was made, in either the 1930 or 1942 Board 
rulings, of any limitations or restrictions on number of 
employees, parking facilities, "family" involvement or 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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occupation of the residence. When the Board, in 1973, 
enumerated such restrictions, it did so wholly without 
foundation or legal basis. The court below acknowledged 
that the Board was imposing new restrictions. (R.97) 
Plaintiffs1 attorney correctly argued before the Board 
of Adjustment in December, 1973, that "the current uses of 
the property are a logical extension of the variances 
granted and do not exceed the variance approved in 1942 
wherein the property was used as a machine shop for the 
making of tools." (Exhibit 10-P) He further argued, and 
correctly so, that "there was no difference between the 
running of the machine shop and the light manufacturing 
and 'working on an antique car.'" 
When Mr. Smith inspected the property in April, prior 
to purchasing, he observed that the shop was being utilized 
by a company which was assembling, painting and storing 
light fixtures. The attached garage was occupied for 
storage purposes by two dragster automobiles. He observed 
three or four individuals working in the machine shop. 
(R.62-63) That was the sum total of the "business" or shop 
portion of the property. 
In view of the liberal interpretations previously made 
by the Board with respect to this property, the 1973 Board's 
conclusion that the present uses were contrary to the spirit 
and intent of the Zoning Ordinance was not only without 
legal basis but totally inconsistent with the prior rulings. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mr. Johnson's statement and interpretation with regard 
to the uses allowed under the variance has more legal basis, 
is more logical and reasonable than the Board's subsequent 
decision. 
Plaintiffs' argument in the court below that defendant 
misrepresented by stating that R-2 zoning permitted 
duplexes is likewise without merit. The letter from the 
City Planning Director states that the Residential "R-2" 
district zoning classification perraits two-family dwellings. 
(Exhibit 20-P) The testimony below disclosed that the 
residence had been a duplex for at least 25 years and 
probably longer. (R.93) Apparently no permit had been 
obtained at the time the residence was converted to a 
duplex; however, that does not make it illegal. The court 
below stated defendant's position well when it said: 
?The Court: 
"If the zoning ordinance permits duplexes in that 
area, how can the Citv complain they have a duplex 
there?" (R.93) 
* * * 
"I suppose all the City could do if it could do 
anything would be to complain about no building 
permit having been issued and that would be a 
personal matter and the statute of limitations would 
have barred that by now." (R.94) 
The following exchange between counsel and court further 
disposed of the matter of the duplex: 
rMr* Nielsen: 
"And, in any event, if the Court please, . . . that 
15 
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building permit could be taken out any time by anybody 
if it is a matter of a permit." (R.94) 
The Court: 
"I don't think it is too late. I don't think they 
have to get a permit in that late of the day. It may 
be unlawful to make certain changes in the building 
without a permit, and they may make it a misdemeanor." 
(R.94) 
Mr. Dodd: 
"They may turn out our tenants. . . . " 
The Court: 
"I think they have no right to do that." 
Mr. Dodd: 
"They did, though." 
The Court: 
"Did they do it?" 
Mr. Nielsen: 
"No, there is no testimony they did." 
The Court: 




"You didn't have to do it. Knowing you as well as I 
do, I don't think you would do it just because somebody 
tells you to." (R.94) 
The court below admitted that it would like to be able 
to reverse the decision of the Board of Adjustment. (R.118) The 
court was not being asked to reverse the Board's decision. 
16 
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however. It was the court's duty merely to decide whether 
the statements made by defendant were false at the time 
they were made. In view of the foregoing arguments, 
defendant submits that the court should have come to the 
opposite conclusion. 
C. Variance Runs with the Land. 
It appears to have been undisputed below that a 
variance runs with the land* (R.119,126) The law is well 
stated in 58 AM. JUR. , Zoning, §215: 
"The right to make a non-conforming use of zoned 
premises, under a grant of a variation for such 
purpose, has been held not to be a mere personal 
license or permit to the applicant or his assigns, 
but to attach to the premises and to be available to 
a subsequent purchaser thereof." 
In accord are 168 ALR 122; Cohn v. County Board of 
Supervisors, 135 Cal.2d 180, 286 P.2d 836 (1955); State v. 
Konopka, 119 Ohio App. 513, 200 N.E.2d 695 (1963). 
Plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits which had 
been established by the variance granted in 1930 as expanded 
in 1942, and any representation to that effect was reasonable 
and true. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ON NOTICE THAT THE SHOPS WERE BEING UTILIZED 
PURSUANT TO VARIANCE AND NON-CONFORMING USE PERMIT AND 
CONSEQUENTLY HAD A DUTY TO INQUIRE AS TO THE USE PRIOR TO 
PURCHASE. 
Mr. Smith testified that he was advised by Mr. Johnson 
17 
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that the shops were being operated pursuant to a 1945 
non-conforming use permit which would be invalid if the 
property was left vacant for one year and one day. (Exhibit 
11-D; R.25) 
He also testified that he holds a masters degree in 
public administration (R.42); that he has been employed 
since 1966 primarily as an cissistant to city managers (R.42) 
in Berkeley, El Cerrito, San Gabriel, Lindsay and Riverside, 
all in California (R.42); that he was familiar with city 
planning and the layout of a city (R.43); that he was aware 
that cities had zoning rules and regulations (R.43); that 
he was aware that certain sections of the city were zoned 
for residential purposes as compared to commercial and other 
purposes (R.44); that he was* aware that if a particular 
area was zoned for one use, it couldn't be used for another 
purpose unless there was some kind of a variance granted 
(R.44); that he was entirely familiar with the terms 
"variance" and "non-conforming use" at the time he talked 
to Mr. Johnson on the phone (R.44) and that he knew that 
if a person was using the property zoned for one use 
inconsistent with that zoning regulation, it would have 
to be pursuant to some variance or non-conforming use. 
(R.44) 
\ In spite of his familiarity with zoning, variances 
and non-conforming use, Mr. Smith chose to ignore the 
public records which were available to him, as well as to 
Mr. Johnson. 
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In view of the facts previously stated, however, it 
is likely, had Mr. Smith examined the public record prior 
to purchase, that he would have concluded, just as he 
ultimately argued before the Board, that the present use 
of the property was consistent with the variance(s) previously 
granted. 
This case is a good illustration of the policy of the 
law and reasons behind the principles of law previously 
stated, that representations as to what the law will or will 
not permit, relating to rights in and to land, are expressions 
of opinion, and even if they prove adverse to a subsequent 
legal decision, will not establish prior fraud or form the 
basis of recovery for false representation. 
There is no testimony that Mr. Smith at any time asked 
Mr. Johnson for a copy of the variance or the City's decisions 
granting variance or that he asked Mr. Johnson to explain 
the terms of the same 
If anything is to be implied from Johnson's statements, 
it would be that they were legal conclusions or legal 
opinions such that would put Smith on notice, particularly 
with his background in city administration, to determine the 
legal significance of the non-conforming use himself. 
In the case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 
273 (1952), this Court held that as to those things which 
the vendee could find out for himself with reasonable 
inquiry, he could not rely upon the representations of the 
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vendor while there was nothing in the representations of 
the vendor which precluded him from doing it. 
The reasons generally advanced as the basis of the 
rule that fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations 
as to matters of law are that everyone is presumed to know 
the law, both civil and criminal, and is bound to take 
notice of it, and therefore cannot, in legal contemplation, 
be deceived by such representations. 37 AM. JUR. 2d, supra, 
§73. One has no right to rely on such representations or 
opinions, and should not be permitted to say that he was 
misled by them. 
I n
 Scott v. Wilson, 15 111. App. 2d 456, 146 N.E.2d 
397 (1957), the court held that: 
"Even if the fact that a basement apartment in a building 
was occupied by tenants and that rent was being collected 
from it when the purchasers made an inspection prior to 
purchasing the building constituted a representation by 
conduct that such occupation was not in violation of a 
city zoning ordinance, such representation would not 
entitle the purchasers to rescission of the contract 
after they were * equired to cease renting such basement 
apartment because occupancy thereof was in violation 
of the city zoning ordinance, since such representation 
was a representation of law, and not of fact, and was 
the type of representation concerning which both parties 
had equal opportunity to inform themselves. 
POINT III 
BY TAKING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO BRING THE QUESTION OF USE 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND BY FAILING TO APPEAL THE 
DECISION OF THE BOARD, PLAINTIFFS RATIFIED ANY POSSIBLE 
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In the court below plaintiffs' attorney posed the 
question, "How far does a man have to go to pull himself 
out of a situation. . . . " (R.90) The court responded by 
saying: 
"I would suspect that you would have to go farther 
than just the Board of Adjustment. I think you would 
have to go to court and get a decree of the court." 
Plaintiffs' counsel stated that they "appealed to the 
Board of Adjustment to see if the existing uses at the time 
of the sale were permitted under the variance." (R.135) 
The time for rescission, if indeed plaintiffs were 
entitled to that remedy, would have been in the first 
instance after discovering the alleged wrong. Once 
plaintiffs undertook affirmative action before the Board, 
however, they were bound to exhaust their remedies by appeal 
before they could be entitled to rescind, particularly where 
the facts of the case disclose that the Board's decision 
was tenuous and on weak legal footings. 
CONCISION 
For the foregoiag reasons, Defendant and Appellant 
respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD & 
GOTTFREDSON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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